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IN THE SUPRE.ME, COURT
of the

SITATE O.F UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF· THE ESTATE
OF
GERTRUDE LOUISE RICHARDS,
Deceased,
CATHERINE R. HOWELL,
CATHERINE S. CRESS and
CHARLES RICHARD SCHNEIDER,
0 ontestants and Respondents, Case No. 8452
-vs.-

JANET R. PARKER,
Proponent and Appellant,
WALKER BANI( & TRUST
COMPANY,
Executor.
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF PROPONENT
AND APPELLANT, JANET R. PARKER
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH:
The proponent and appellant, Janet R. Parker, respectfully petitions this Court for a rehearing on its
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opinion issued in the above entitled cause on the 16th
day of May, 1956. The petition is based upon the following grounds :
1. The decision vitiates the legislative intent and
overrules the decisions of this Court relating to subscribing witnesses.
2. The Court improperly applied the rule that the
prevailing parties are entitled to have all of the evidence
and the inferences fairly drawn viewed in a light most
favorable to them.
3. The Court erred in holding that the opinions of
the subscribing witnesses and of an attorney were not
entitled to undue weight.
4. The Court erred in holding admissible conjectural testimony by an expert not having personal obserwvation and its application of the rule as to the burden of proof.
The attorneys for the proponent and appellant hereby certify that this petition for rehearing is made in
good faith and not for the purpose of delay.

Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN, RICH.A.RDS, niATTSSON & EVANS
Attorneys for Proponent and Appellant
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ARGUMENT
The argument in the above entitled matter w,as made
before this Court on the 11th day of April, 1956, and the
opinion was filed on ~Iay 16, 1956. We feel that there
are several serious questions which must be brought to
the attention of the Court which, in our opinion, cast
serious doubt upon prior decisions of this Court and the
validity of wills .and other test4,mentary documents. We
take it that the doctrine of stare decisis has not been repudiated and that counsel may look to the decisions of
this Court as precedents, having the force and in all
respects the dignity of law.
This Court has in every decision, with practically
no variation in the language used, stated the rule by
which mental competency is determined. If there is no
substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably
find the ultimate facts required by the rule, then this
Court has as much duty to reverse as it does to sustain
in a case vvhere there is substantial evidence to sustain
the finding. In Re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 P. 452.
POINT I.
THE DECISION VITIATES THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND OVERRULES THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
RELATING TO SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES.

The execution and attestation of wills is the most
formal and mandatory act in our law. It is so to the
extent that this Court has held that a witness has no
right to subscribe thereto unless he is first satisfied of
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the testator's mental capacity. In Re Swan's Estate,
supra. The legislature created the formality and with
respect thereto this Court has said that where the formalities are prescribed a failure to comply therewith
may not be excused even by demonstrating that a less
stringent requirement would be as effective. In Re Alexander's Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 P. 2d 432.
It is generally said to be the law that a complete
attestation clause, reciting an observance of all statutory
requirements, raises a presumption of the due execution
of the will. 76 A.L.R. 617. The rigid formality of the
execution and attestation of the will is necessary for
the purpose of in1pressing the "actors" \Yith the seriousness of the situation and the integrity with which they
1nust act. It is believed that the opinion herein has obliterated the sincerity and completely diluted the integrity
of the testamentary acts.
Judge Thurman, spe.aking In Re 8'lcan··s Estate, supra,
set forth the status of the subscribing witnesses in the
following language:
"This testimony alone constitutes a prima
facie case in favor of the testator's mental capacity. That, together \Yith the other facts testified
to by then1 as to the testator having declared the
instrument to be his "\Yilt and the "Titnesses having
signed their names in his presence, and in the
presence of earh other, constituted a prima facie
case entitling the "\vill to probate. These men, as
subscribing witnesses, filled the requirements of
the law in every particular. Their relations to
the testator were such as to render them capable
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of judging of his mental capacity at the time of
~ecuting the will. It was their duty to pass upon
that qualification. They did pass upon it and
found him mentally capable of executing ,a will
and disposing of his property. It seems to us that
a strict, fair, and honest application of the rule
above referred to, having its foundation in the
Constitution itself, and affirmed and reaffirmed
over and over .again by the decisions of this court,
ought to end the controversy, even at this point,
without further reference to the evidence in the
case."
And in the same case, "\\'"here incidently a question of
senile dementia was raised by the use of expert medical
testimony, the Court on page 455 placed great weight
on the testimony of subscribing witnesses who had known.
the testator and had testified without the entertainment
of any doubt respecting his mental capacity at the time
the will was made, in spite of the fact that the testator
was physically declining and that his once strong mind
and intellect were slowly, but surely, beco,Jning enfeebled.
In the instant case the subscribing witnesses were
people such as characterized by the Court In Re Swan's
Estate, supra, and neither entertained or expressed any
doubt .as to the testatrix' mental competency. As in the
Swan case, supra, this was not the only evidence of competency and, as a matter of fact, except for the recollection of Dr. Copeland made from his notes as of 8 :00
o'clock in the morning of the day of the execution of
the codicil and the hypothetical testimony of Dr. Currier,
there was no evidence of incompetency. The contestants
testified that she w.as m~ntally competent.
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It appears strange that the testimony of an ejXpert,
speaking in terms of probability and who had never seen
the testatrix in her lifetime, can overcome and destroy
the constitutional and legislative edict relating to subscribing witnesses. It is our belief that any will prepared
by a person over the age of 60, this Court having now
adjudicated such people as senile, is immediately tainted
with invalidity if an expert, in response to a hypothetical
question, can say that it would seem highly unlikely that
such a person could make any decision of lasting or
serious importance.
As to subscribing witnesses the Court held:
"First of all, in the instant case, it should
be noted that the subscribing witnesses were not
experts and their opinions were only those of lay
persons and therefore should not be given undue
weight."
The Court cited in support of this In Re Hanson's Estate,
87 Utah 580, 52 P. 2d 1103. We cannot find any statement in that case which supports the Court. As .a matter
of fact the case reaffirms In Re SzDan)s Estate, supra,
which held at page 458 as follows :
"The foregoing cases support the proposition
that nonexpert "\Yitnesses are con1petent in cases
of this kind, and many of then1 go so far as to
hold that the testin1onY of "itnesses who were
intimately acquainted ~1~th the deceased in his
lifetime, and farniliar 'loith his n~ental conrditi-an
at the time when the instrunzent was ea:ecuted, is
entitled to greater weight than the testimony of
med,ical experts who had no such acquaintance
or knowledge of conditions.'-' (Emphasis added.)
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The reference by the Court to the personal knowledge of the subscribing witnesses is interesting and it
is noted that in the dissenting opinion Dr. Beatty's testi·mony on page 465 begins: "From my personal observations of Mr. Swan in his lifetime * * * ." It is hard to
see how the instant case, In Re Swan's Estate and In Re
Hanson's Estate, on the facts and on the law, can stand
side by side.
POINT II.
'THE COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE RULE THAT
THE PREVAILING PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE
ALL OF 'THE EVIDEN,CE AND THE INFERENCES FAIRLY
DRAWN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO
THEM.

The statement is made in the opinion that the testatrix was stuporous while the subscribing witnesses were
there. Such testimony was that ·of Dr. Copeland, an interne, who was not one of the subscribing 'vitnesses and
who had to refer to hospital records to refresh his
memory (R. 235), which notation was made relating to
a condition found at 8 :00 or 9 :00 o'clock in the morning (R. 258). And upon the inference that an in~'\-enous
feeding at 2 :00 o'clock P.M., some six hours later, was
proof that the testatrix was stuporous (R. 147). The
only inference favorable or otherwise from this fact is
that, the testatrix having said "I have some important
business with these gentlemen," the doctor knew she was
mentally fit to conduct such business. He certainly did
not act to the contrary. If the decision herein is the law,
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the jury can invalidate a will on the most nebulous of
testimony. The word "stuporous" has many connotations.
This Court in every decision relating to tesiltmentary
capacity has stated the test to be whether or not the
testatrix had sufficient mind and memory at the time of
making the will to remember what were the natural objects of her bounty, to recall her property and dispose of
it understandingly in accord with some plan. In Re
Swan's Estate, supra, In Re Hanson's Estate, supra, In
the Matter of t·he Estate of W·ilda Gail Swan, Deceased,
______ Utah ______ , 293 P. 2d 682, and in the instant case the
Court restated the rule, prefacing it with the remark
that "all that is required is that one have sufficient
mental capacity."
In the testin1ony of Dr. Currier on direct examination, beginning at transcript p.age 320 to the end of the
direct examination on page 333, evidence from the expert as to decedent's ability to remember her property,
the natural objects of her bounty and her ability to dispose of her property according to her plan were atteinpted to be elicited by contestants. Every question
and answer was stricken because of uncertainty and because they had no probative Yalue.
The prior decisions laid down by tlris Court cannot
be interpreted to mean that testin1ony as to eompetency
can be the 1nere ultimate conc.lusion of an expert, yet the
Court now rules that such conclusions are admissible
by stating: "that the collective result is that it would
seem highly unlikely that the person could make any
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decision of lasting or serious importance." This Court
In Re Hanson's Estate, supra, at page 1116, stated:
"Since the jury and no one else had the right
to conclude as to whether she was incompetent
to make a will, testimony that she was not so competent must be ignored. Such testimony as to her
being of 'unsound mind,' unable to 'transact business,' or that she 'could not reason,' must all be
measured and limited in its content by the underlying facts given in support of such impressions
and in the light of all the other testimony. They
are elastic phrases which may mean much or
little, depending on the sense in which they are
used and the contents with which invested."
If any reliance may be had on that case, then is not the
testimony of Dr. Currier to be ignored, and the testimony of Dr. Copeland that Miss Richards was stuporous
to be measured and limited by the underlying facts~ If
such be the case, then this Court must reverse its opinion
in the instant case or should specifically reverse In Re
Hanson's Estate, supr.a. In the latter case, while it must
be inferred that the finding of mental incapacity was
sustained, the Court had great difficulty in spite of the
fact that thirty separate facts were found by the Court,
and on page 1117 there of it w.as stated:
"By what has been brought out above, it
amply appears that Marie's mind, even though
it ·may not have lacked tesfflrnentary capacity, was
one e.asily susceptible of being played upon. In
the light of Marie's mental capacity and Dr. McDonald's conduct, there is ample evidence to support the finding of undue influence." (Emphasis
added.)
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We take it that the rule that the prevailing party is
entitled to every intendment and inference fairly drawn
from the evidence must be founded on the proposition
that there is some evidence of incompetency. We submit
that there is none. This Court has often stated that as
the rule, but whether or not it feels bound in every instance appears open to question. Hoyt et al. v. Wasatch
Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9J 261 P. 2d 927. Kimball Elevator
Co. v. Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah 2d 289, 272 P. 2d. 583.
The decision herein is pointed in its failure to comment upon the testimony of the subscribing witnesses and
Joseph S. Jones, except that it was tainted with an interest, and the testimony of Dr. Galligan, an eminent
Physician and Surgeon with forty-three years of practice
(R. 267), who had treated the decedent for twenty years
(R. 267), and the testimony of the contestants. Assuming
that by the use of the word "inference" it is meant "a
process of reasoning hy 'vhich a fact or proposition sought
to he established is deduced as a logical consequence from
other facts or a state of facts already proved or admitted" (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition), can it
he inferred:
That "stuporous," b~~ logical eonsequence ,and
ded uetion, n1eans n1en tal inc apaeity ~
That •'it see1ns highly unlikely," b~~ logical
eonsequence and deduction, 1neans 1nental incapacity1
Assu1ning that the Court considered all of the evidence,
what favor.able inferences can be deduced in favor of
the prevailing parties 1
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From the testimony of Dr.

Galligan~

From the testimony of the subscribing witnesses~
From the testimony of the witness Joseph S. Jones~
From the testimony of the contestants

themselves.~

We must assume none because the Court did not point
to any of the testimony or suggest any inference favorable to the contestants. The testimony of all of the witnesses who had personal observ.ation was positive and
unequivocal that the testatrix was competent. Can it be
that the basis of the decision is that the testatrix was
seriously ill and suffering pain~ The only testimony in
that regard is Dr. Gallig.an's statement that people dying
of cancer for months, sometimes years, in an extreme
state of physical exhaustion, were not mentally affected
(R. 287). No inference favorable to the contestants can
be drawn from such testimony. Of course, undue influ ..
ence, while squinted at by the Court in the statement
relating to "vindicating the propriety of their conduct,"
could not be the basis of the decision because the trial
court refused to le~t that issue go to the jury.
POINT III.
'THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OPINIONS OF THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES AND OF AN
ATTORNEY WERE NOT ENTITLED TO UNDUE WEIGHT.

This Court held in the instant case:
"Second, the witnesses have an interest in
the outcome which always may be taken into con-
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sideration as a factor which may discount testimony. This is not limited to where the witnesses
are actual parties or have a direct pecuniary interest, but in addition, there may he the case as here - where the witnesses (both connected
with the executor, ·either as employees or counsel)
have an interest by way of vindicating the propriety of their conduct."
Assuming that there is evidence in the record that
Joseph S. Jones was an attorney for the executor, it is
hard to visualize a situation more depreciating to a lawyer than for the Supreme Court to say that he has no
more knowledge than an untrained layman and therefore
his testimony is not entitled to undue weight as to what
constitutes mental capacity to make a will. The question
can approp-riately be ,asked: Who has more knowledge
and whose testimony should be given more weight on
this question than a lawyerf In spite of the fact that
he is an officer of the court and should be presumed to
testify honestly, even in the absence of an oath, why
should the Court affirn1 a jury finding and, in effect,
say that he is not entitled to credit because he is a lay
witness and is a member of the firm which represents
the executor and a partner of the attorney· who drew the
will and thereby has an interest in the outco1ne and would
color his testi1nony because he "~as vindicating the propriety of his conduct. If this is the ruling of the Court,
thousands of wills will be declared invalid 1nerely because they vrere witnessed by ,a la,vyer in the san1e office as the one who drew the instrument. A reading of
the testimony will show that the attorney witness was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
m~iculous in his discussion with the testatrix so that

when she signed he would have no doubt as to her capacity, otherwise he would not have signed.

In Re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602, the
testator was seriously ill by reason of an operation and
he wished to make a will. R. J. Douglas, an attorney of
Ogden, Utah, was called in the evening to the hospital.
He was told by the doctor that the man was seriously
ill and in great pain. The testator's religious advisor
was also present. Douglas drew the will and an interne
and nurse witnessed it. As to the Priest the Court said :
"It cannot be said that the witnesses were
hostile, prejudiced, or biased, or that their testimony was improbable. There is not anything in
the record to show hostility. True, Father Kennedy had an interest as executor, and was indirectly interested because of his connection with
the beneficiary, but that is not such an interest
.as necessarily to make him hostile where no such
attitude is apparent from the testimony." (Emphasis added.)
It is not known vvhat the Court at that time thought of
Mr. Douglas, but it did say on page 611:
"Mr. Douglas is a lawyer of repute and many
years, experience. Not anything is made to appear that would indic.ate he was hostile, prejudiced, or biased. His testimony is unimpeached.''
Referring to the bias and prejudice, the Court further
st.ated at page 607 :
"Douglas had no interest whatever in the outcome of the case. He performed his services, and
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was paid therefor. The record does not disclose
anything from which it might be inferred that
he was anything but fair and impartial in his
conduct or testimony."
Mr. Jones is a lawyer of repute with considerable
experience and would not color his testimony to vindicate
the p·ropriety of his conduct. The testimony of Joseph
S. Jones was unimpeached. Can the executor or any of
its employees, counsel or otherwise he said to have as
much of an interest as Father Kennedy in the Bryan
case, supra. None of the witnesses for the proponent
were to gain any part of the estate and the holding that
they had an interest that would taint their testimony
with bias and prejudice is not supported by the record.
The contestants were the only witnesses who stood to
gain yet none said she- was incompetent. It does not appear how In Re Bryan's Estate, supra, and the instant
case can stand side by side. If the holding in the instant
case is the intention of the Court, it should, in specific
language, reverse In Re Bryan's Estate, supra.
In the c.ase In tlze A.nlatter of the Estate of Wilda
Gail Swan, Deceased, supra, this Court held that the at-

torney who drew the 'viii, and 'vas the beneficiary of a
substantial part of the estate, 'vas the victim of a technical rule of la,v. This ease appears to be a complete
turnabout, inferring bias in testimony of a law~~,.er for
merely being a witness when he did not dra'v the will
nor receive a bequest therefrom.
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POINT IV.
THE ·COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ADMISSIBLE CONJECTURAL TESTIMONY BY AN EXPERT NOT HAVING
PERSONAL OBSERVATION AND ITS APPLICATION OF
THE RULE AS TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

In the ·matter of the Estate of Wilda Gail Swan,
supra, the Court held that the contestant had the bur. .
den of proof or persuading the trier of the fact that she
lacked testamentary capacity. The Court concluded that
in view of all the evidence the finding of the trial court
that she lacked testamentary capacity "'Tas unreasonable
.and must be reversed. The basis of the decision is that
the evidence did not indicate that she could not remember
the natural objects of her bounty or did not keep in mind
her property or lacked the ability to dispose of it understandingly in accordance with some purpose or plan. In
that case the bulk of the estate went to persons completely
unrelated to the testatr1x and the only evidence of a plan
was that she was unusually generous or improvident in
making loans or gifts to friends, that she promised or
suggested to various persons that she would make them
beneficiaries under her will and that she ,asked her
friends if they would like to manage her property. In
the instant case the fact that the testatrix knew the
natural objects of her bounty was perfectly obvious as
they were the only ones who received a bequest. The
quarrel is between those persons as to how much they
should receive. Certainly the plan had at least as much
substance as the indiscriminate beneficiaries in the Wilda
Gail Swan case, supra, and was certainly disposed of
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with at least as much understanding. The testimony of
the subscribing witnesses in the Wilda Gail Swan case,
supra, relating to competency was not as strong as the
testimony in the instant case. Here the contestants even
testified that they considered Miss Richards capable of
handling her affairs, and this testimony was in the light
of visits to the hospital before and after the execution of
the codicil in question. Certainly the presumption spelled
out by the Court in the Wilda Gail Swan case relating to
undue influence is equally applicable to the presumption
of mental capacity because the Court held that contestants had the burden of persuading the trier of the fact.
Why does the Court take the position in the instant
case that the characterization as stuporous met the burden of proof and persuading the trier of fact~ If that
is justified, why in the face of more substantial evidence
in the Wilda Gail Swan case, supra, did the Court reverse
the finding of incompetency~ ''Te assume that in both
eases the Court followed the rule that the party prevailing below was entitled to have all of the evidence and
every intendment and inference fairly drawn therefrom
viewed in the light n1ost favorable to them.
The Court in its opinion herein said:
"Counsel further suggests that the answers of
this expert were so uncertain and yague that they
should not have be·en sub1nitted to the jury, citing
Moore v. D. & R. G. '';· R. Co." (244 P. 2d 628,
Utah).
Couns-el does not recall arguing the l\loore case to the
Court and it was .appended to the brief because the opin-
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ion had not been filed at the time the brief was printed.
We believe the Court has overruled it in spite of the
statement that counsel had erroneously interpreted the
holding. In the Moore case, supra, the doctor had examined the patient, not for purposes of treatment but
for the purpose of testifying in the c.ase. The Court
therUn stated "the appellant argues that the testimony
of the doctor, guarded in expression as it is and based
in a large part on subjective symptoms related by respondent, is insufficient to provide a question of e;xistence
of an injured disc for the consideration of the jury, and
hence the trial court erred in failing to instruct to that
effect." In interpreting the language of the Court we
have assumed that it is a fair statement to say that the
expert in the 1\!Ioore case w.as testifying from personal
observation. On the admissibility of this evidence the
Court held:
"This Court has long recognized that the
mere use of words such as 'belief,' 'impression,'
'probability,' or 'possibility' will not exclude a witness's testimony where his expression does not
indicate a lack of personal observation, but merely
the degree of positiveness of his original observation of the facts or the degree of positiveness of
his recollection; * * *." (Emphasis added.)
The Court s.ays that we have interpreted this decision
erroneously upon the ground that the testimony was
inadmissible because of the use of words such as "belief," "impression," "probability," or "possibility." That
is not our interpretation of the case. We interpret the
specific holding in the Moore case to be that where there
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was persona.l observation the use of such words only goes
to the recollection of the witness as to facts he observed.
From the language of the Court that "the mere use of
words such as 'belief,' 'impression,' 'probability,' or
'possibility' " will not exclude a witness' testimony where
his expression does not indicate a lack of personal observation," we interpret the holding to be that where the
witness had no personal observation and is, therefore,
not recalling what he observed, that the testimony is inadmissible. Our interpretation is based upon whether
or not the witness had personal observation. If the Moore
case cannot be interpreted as we contend, then why did
the Court use language referring to personal observation~ Counsel, in attempting to analyze decisions, must
read vvhat is written and cannot risk assuming that the
expressions of the Court are redundant, surplusage or
inadvertent. If the instant case holds that testimony,
not based on personal observation, qualified by "highly
unlikely," or "I would expect," or "I suppose" is admissible, then this Court should specifically state that
JJ1oore v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co. is overruled or modified.

The testimony of Dr. Currier raises a further question. At best it is supposition and conjecture. It only
affords a choice of probabilities. One is that it would
seen1 highly unlikely that the person could make any
decisions of lasting or serious importance. The other
probability is obvious, that it would seem likel)~ that the
person could make .a decision of lasting or serious importance. This Court has held that a jury verdict eannot stand on a basis of conjecture in a civil case where
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a mere preponderance is the rule and no presump~tion requiring the burden of persuasion was present. In .Alverado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d. 16, 268 P. 2d. 986, this
Court held:
"The burden was upon plaintiff to prove the
charge of speeding; such a finding of fact could
not be based on mere speculation or conjecture,
but only on a preponderance of the evidence. This
means the greater weight of the evidence, or as
sometimes stated, such degree of proof that the
greater probability of truth lies therein. A choice
of probabilities does not meet this requirement.
It creates only a basis for conjecture, on which
a veTdict of the jury cannot stand."
CONCLUSION
We believe that the principle of law laid down by
the Court relating to mental competency is proper, but
we contend that the principle as to subscribing witnesses, the interest they might have by reason of being connected with the executor, and the principle relating to
the weight of lay witnesses and attorneys, and the principle relating to the admissibility of conjectural testimony, is contrary to the precedents affirmed and reaffirmed over and over again by this Court. In Re Latsis'
Estate, 3 -utah 2d 365 284 P. 2d 479, this Court on rehearing stated:
"Though we need make no modification in
the legal principles enunciated, we find it necessary to reconsider our construction of the facts
to which the principles are applied."
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While we are without the benefit of numerous amici
curiae, as in the Latsis case, we respectfully urge that
the decision herein departs from well established precedents and casts a shadow of invalidity on a substantial number of wills yet to be probated. We ask that the
Court reconsider the legal principles enunciated and reconsider its construction of the facts to the legal principles as they might be re-examined. We believe serious
error has been committed, but in any event a rehearing
should be granted if only to rationalize this case with
previous decisions of the Court.

Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS, MATTSSON
& EVANS
Attorneys for Proponent
and Appellant
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